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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In 1978, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that a statute proscribing medical "misconduct" was unconsti-
tutionally vague as applied to a physician whose license had been sus-
pended for performing acupuncture in a manner that the supervisory
commission deemed unacceptable.' The constitutional flaw was that the
commission had not properly promulgated standards to put the physician
on notice as to what constituted misconduct with regard to acupuncture
treatments.2 This past year in Woods v. District of Columbia Nurses' Exam-
ining Board,3 the court quietly, yet dramatically, extended this holding.
The Woods court held that a registered nurse, who had already been
granted a hearing prior to the revocation of her license, had a constitu-
tional right to a reinstatement hearing and, furthermore, that even a hear-
ing would not be sufficient in this case, as the standards governing
reinstatement were void for vagueness.
Barbara Woods was licensed to practice nursing in both Maryland and
the District of Columbia.' In 1978, the Maryland Board of Examiners of
Nursing revoked her Maryland license due to various incidents of unsatis-
factory performance.' Upon receiving a copy of the Maryland revocation
order, the District of Columbia Nurses' Examining Board began discipli-
nary proceedings against Woods that resulted in a hearing, after which her
District of Columbia license was also revoked.6 Woods later applied to the
District of Columbia Board for reinstatement, based in part upon the fact
that her license had previously been restored in Maryland.' When her ap-
plication was denied without a hearing, she brought suit in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals.8 This suit for reinstatement was consolidated
with her previously filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the origi-
1. Lewis v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Licensure to Practice the Healing Art,
385 A.2d 1148 (D.C. 1978).
2. Id at 1153.
3. 436 A.2d 369 (D.C. 1981).
4. Id at 370.
5. Id at 371. The alleged misconduct included various incidents of patient neglect as
well as sleeping on duty. Id at 370-71.
6. Id at 371-72. While the District of Columbia proceedings were in progress, Woods
had petitioned for reinstatement in Maryland. That petition was granted shortly after her





As consolidated, the suit alleged that the original revocation deprived
Woods of her fifth amendment right to due process as it was based (1) on
conduct occurring in Maryland, and (2) on the findings of the Maryland
Board which were challenged as defective.' ° Additionally, she alleged that
the subsequent reinstatement proceedings were also unconstitutional
under the fifth amendment because she was denied a hearing and, alterna-
tively, that the standards governing reinstatement were unconstitutionally
vague. '
The court did not pass on the constitutionality of the initial revocation.12
Instead, it ruled that the reinstatement proceedings were constitutionally
defective for the reasons cited by the plaintiff. 3 In holding that due pro-
cess required a reinstatement hearing,' 4 the majority noted that the right to
practice one's chosen profession is a liberty interest that cannot be taken
away without some kind of a hearing.' 5 And, because the denial of a rein-
statement application effectively precludes one from practicing a profes-
sion, the due process clause guarantees a hearing for reinstatement
applications as well as initial revocations. 6 However, the majority did not
cite any support for this proposition. Nevertheless, it held that Woods had
a fifth amendment right to a reinstatement hearing and that the regulations
governing occupational and professional licensing boards, which specifi-
9. Id
10. Id at 370. The alleged defects in the Maryland proceeding related mostly to manip-
ulation of the hearing date by the Maryland Board of Examiners of Nursing. The original
date for the hearing was rescheduled solely for the convenience of the Board. On the morn-
ing set for the rescheduled hearing, the Board notified Woods' attorney that it was going to
postpone the hearing until that afternoon, with full knowledge that the attorney had a prior
court commitment that afternoon. Thus, Woods was forced to attend the hearing without
benefit of counsel because the Board refused to reschedule the hearing a third time. Id at
371.
11. Id. at 370, 372-73.
12. Id at 370.
13. Id at 370, 372-73.
14. The majority also held that the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act
(DCAPA), D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1509 (1981) requires a hearing in "contested cases". Woods,
436 A.2d at 373. However, this basis for the decision is insignificant since the only reason
that Woods' reinstatement was a "contested case" is because the majority determined that
Woods had a constitutional right to a reinstatement hearing under the DCAPA. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-1502(8) (1981) (definition of contested case includes agency proceedings
where party has constitutional right to a hearing).
15. Woods, 436 A.2d at 372. The court cited many Supreme Court cases supporting this
proposition, including Willner v. Commission on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102-03
(1963) and Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
16. Woods, 436 A.2d at 373.
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cally denied this right, were unconstitutional.' 7
Once Woods' right to a reinstatement hearing was established, the ma-
jority was able to consider her second claim that the hearing itself would
necessarily violate due process because the regulations governing reinstate-
ment were overly vague. '8 These regulations, which were entitled "Recon-
sideration or Reinstatement," stated that the District of Columbia Nurses'
Examining Board could reissue a license upon a showing of cause satisfac-
tory to it.' 9
The majority defined the test of unconstitutional vagueness as whether
"persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at what conduct
the regulation either proscribed or required."2 Stating that it was difficult
to envision a regulation requiring more guesswork,2' the majority found it
to be unconstitutionally vague in several ways. First, the Board could rein-
state Woods' license upon a showing of satisfactory cause, but the regula-
tion was silent as to what cause should be considered satisfactory. 2
Second, even if a showing of satisfactory cause was made, the Board was
still free to deny reinstatement since the regulation used the word "may,"
thus making its decision purely discretionary.23 Finally, the court noted
that the regulation failed to differentiate between the concepts of reconsid-
eration and reinstatement.2 4 According to the majority, an individual who
applies to an administrative agency for reconsideration of a license revoca-
tion decision is asking the agency to admit that it erred in its original deci-
sion; an individual who petitions for reinstatement does not challenge the
correctness of the original decision but instead asks the agency for reissu-
ance of the license in light of subsequently occurring facts u.2 The constitu-
tional flaw in enmeshing these two distinct concepts was that the Board
17. Id
18. The standards had been promulgated by the Council of the District of Columbia in
its 1972 set of regulations which were made applicable to 21 occupational and professional
licensing boards, including the Nurses' Examining Board. Id
19. As cited in the court's opinion, the regulation reads as follows:
A person whose application for a license or renewal of a license has been denied or
whose license has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the Board may, by
filing a new application accompanied by the proper fee, request the Board to re-
consider the matter. Upon showing of cause saisfactory to it, the Board may issue
the license for which application has been made.
5 DD DCRR § 60.4 (emphasis in original). 436 A.2d at 373.
20. Woods, 436 A.2d at 374. This test for vagueness was based on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1972).




25. Id at 374-75.
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might consider irrelevent factors in deciding whether to reissue a license.
For example, as Woods asked for reinstatement rather than reconsidera-
tion, the court pointed out that the Board acted erroneously in reexamin-
ing her conduct prior to the initial revocation.26 Instead, the Board should
have looked to events occurring after the revocation, such as her reinstate-
ment and satisfactory performance in Maryland.27
The majority hinted that any one of these factors standing alone would
have been enough to render the reinstatement procedure unconstitution-
ally vague. In combination, they were fatal and the majority held that the
Nurses' Examining Board, and indeed every occupational licensing board
covered by the regulation, was without power to deny reinstatement appli-
cations until clearer standards were enunciated.28
Dissenting, Judge Kern argued that the court should have ruled on the
validity of the original revocation proceeding as well as the reinstate-
ment.29 Since Woods had been accorded a full and fair hearing and the
Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence, he would have
affirmed the original revocation.3" As to Woods' reinstatement application,
the dissent felt that the record was unclear and that the case should there-
fore be remanded to the Board.3'
The dissent's view, that the court should have decided the validity of the
original revocation, seems to be the more sound. If the original revocation
were deficient, there would have been no need to examine the constitution-
ality of the reinstatement proceeding. However, the dissent's argument that
the case should have been remanded to the Board for clarification has less
merit. If, indeed, the fifth amendment entitled Woods to a reinstatement
hearing and if the standards governing reinstatement were unconstitution-
ally vague, a remand would be counterproductive. In such a case, the lack
of clarity in the administrative record would be a direct manifestation of
the regulation's unconstitutional vagueness.
The key issue, therefore, is whether the majority's substantive conclu-
sions are correct. The majority's first conclusion, that Woods was entitled
to a reinstatement hearing, is crucial since a negative resolution of this
issue would have disposed of the vagueness argument. This conclusion is
by no means clearly mandated. While there is ample authority for the
proposition that some kind of hearing must precede the initial revocation
26. Id at 375.
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id (Kern, J., dissenting).
30. Id at 375-76 (Kern, J., dissenting).
31. Id at 376-77 (Kern, J., dissenting).
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of an occupational license, 2 the majority did not cite any case constitu-
tionally requiring subsequent reinstatement hearings. Thus, a brief exami-
nation of this area appears warranted. 3
Due process analysis requires a court to make two distinct determina-
tions:34 first, whether any process is due" and then, if so, how much pro-
cess is due. Assuming that a reinstatement applicant is entitled to at least
some process,36 the more difficult question is how much process is due. In
Mathews v. Eldridge,3 the Supreme Court identified three factors for
courts to consider in answering this question: (1) the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.38 While these factors lend support to courts that
have concluded that an occupational license may not be initially revoked
absent a full and fair hearing, they do not so compel a hearing for
reinstatement.3 9
32. See, e.g., the cases cited in Woods, 436 A.2d at 372.
33. It should be noted that this area does not lend itself to much "black-letter law." As
the Supreme Court has recently stated, due process eludes precise definition insofar as it is a
nontechnical concept based on actions of "fundamental fairness." Lassiter v. Department of
Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981).
34. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 533 (1978).
35. Id At least some process is due when the government deprives an individual of life,
liberty, or property.
36. Rejection of an individual's reinstatement application would seem to deprive an
individual of the right to practice his chosen profession. Arguably, only the initial license
revocation deprives an individual of his liberty interest and, once a license is revoked, any
liberty interest in practicing a profession is extinguished. However, this seems too narrow a
view and the Woods holding that a reinstatement denial operates just as effectively to de-
prive an individual of his liberty to practice his profession seems the better approach. See
Woods, 436 A.2d at 373. This is not to say, however, that Woods is correct in concluding
that reinstatement applicants are entitled to just as much process (i.e., a hearing) as individu-
als whose licenses have been revoked for the first time; the questions of whether any process
is due and how much process is due are analytically distinct. See L. TRIBE, supra note 34.
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
38. 424 U.S. at 335. See also Sherman v. Commission on Licensure to Practice the
Healing Art, 407 A.2d 595, 600-01 (D.C. 1979).
39. The Mathews factors appear to militate against constitutionally mandated reinstate-
ment hearings. First, the individual's interest in obtaining a hearing is weaker where his or
her license has already been validly revoked. Second, the government's interest is likely to
be stronger as it might be able to point to the spectre of repeated reinstatement hearings and
the concomitant fiscal and administrative burdens. Finally, the risk of erroneous judgment is
less in the reinstatement context because a full hearing has already been provided prior to
the initial revocation. As the Mathews Court noted, there comes a point when "the benefit of
[Vol. 31:768
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Although present notions of due process do not appear to mandate rein-
statement hearings, there may be an alternative theory upon which to jus-
tify the Woods holding. In a different context, the Supreme Court has held
that the right of individuals "to ply their trade, practice their occupation,
or pursue a common calling"' is "fundamental and basic and essential."',
Analogizing these holdings (which concerned the article IV, Privileges and
Immunities Clause) to the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process, one
could argue that extra process is due when the government seeks to pre-
vent individuals from practicing their chosen profession. Under this pro-
posed theory, reinstatement hearings would be required with regard to
occupational licenses, whereas reinstatement hearings might not be consti-
tutionally mandated with regard to, for example, suspended drivers'
licenses.
The Woods decision is indeed a dramatic expansion of due process law
even though the majority did not, at least outwardly, seem to feel that it
was extending established doctrine. While the added protection ensured by
requiring reinstatement hearings seems noble, it is dubious whether the
Supreme Court would agree with the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals on this point.4" Because the law is not fully developed in this area, a
better approach may have been for the majority to support its conclusion
with more substantial analysis. As to the vagueness issue, the majority's
decision appears sound,4 3 although it should be noted that this issue would
not have been considered absent the court's first holding that reinstatement
applicants have a constitutional right to a hearing.
Sean Connelly
an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society
in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost." 424
U.S. at 348.
40. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978).
41. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 435 U.S. 371, 387 (1978). See The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 71, 82-83 (1978).
42. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
43. As the Woods majority noted, there are two main reasons why unduly vague regula-
tions and statutes are violative of due process. 436 A.2d at 373. First, they deprive individu-
als of notice as to what conduct is considered proscribed or required. Id Second, they
encourage arbitrary decision-making by the agency. Id at 373-74. In the Woods case, this
second rationale would appear the more decisive. The Nurses' Examining Board was given
complete discretion in deciding whether to reinstate an occupational license, and its decision
would inevitably be based upon "unarticulated and unannounced standards." Miller v. Dis-
trict of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 294 A.2d 365, 369 (D.C. 1972).
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